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This paper provides empirical assistance in forecasting monetary policy in Switzerland. After the 
introduction, we provide a descriptive analysis of the four cycles of rising interest rates from 1979 
to 2003. It is apparent that the individual cycles diverge to greater or lesser degrees from the aver-
age rising interest rate cycle. The third section evaluates the quality of various market forecasts. 
Regardless of the method of measurement, they show statistically significant and systematic fore-
cast errors. Even simple trend forecasts for money market rates seldom beat the toss of a coin. If we 
divide the observation periods into regimes of rising and of falling interest rates, then forecasts 
based on futures contracts on the 3-month LIBOR are superior to other market variables such as 
forwards or consensus estimates in times when rates are rising. In the fourth section, we assess an 
empirical response function for the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) monetary policy. Due to the long, 
variable time lags with which monetary policy affects the real economy, the central banks must 
adopt a forward-looking approach and base decisions on expectations. Hence by employing consen-
sus forecasts, we use expectations for inflation and growth as explanatory variables. The analysis 
shows that the SNB has a stable interest rate policy, with inflation forecasts weighted four times 
more heavily than growth expectations. Assuming the SNB will behave similarly in the future as it 
did in the past, this rule of thumb allows us to assign historically consistent money market rates to a 
specific macro-economic climate.   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The success of investors active in the Swiss capital market depends heavily on the timing of the 
Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) monetary policy turnarounds. Not only do money market rates, di-
rectly controlled by the central bank, and “short” bond yields go up; yields on long-term bonds 
should move in tandem with the rise on the money market, although by a smaller amount. Figure 1 
shows the trend of the ten-year government bond eight months before and after the first restrictive 
move by the SNB in the last four interest rate cycles. The lines show the month in which the first 
interest rate hike took place. In order to enhance comparability, in all phases the capital market rate 
is rebased to 100 (t) at this time. We observe that capital market rates in general already bottomed 
out ahead of the turnaround. The central factor in common in all four interest rate cycles is that 
eight months after the beginning of the restrictive cycle, interest rates were always higher. With the 
exception of the phase in mid-1988, the increase occurred without interruption. 
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Which tools can an investor use to forecast the SNB’s monetary policy? Economists are basically 
only able to make “conditional” predictions. They must make certain assumptions about the pa-
rameters that they consider relevant for the accuracy of their forecasts. Hence in the second section, 
we attempt to identify the common factors among the past rising interest rate cycles using a descrip-
tive analysis. In the third section we intend to find out how accurate various market forecasts have 
been in the past in predicting money market rates. In the fourth section we attempt to simulate the 
behaviour of the Swiss central bank using a response function in order to link the level of money 
market rates to the economic climate. This report concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
2.  Description of the phases of rising interest rates 
 
In this section we will identify and describe the historical rising interest rate cycles. As a basis, we 
use the SNB’s key interest rate (see Figure 2). The last month before the interest rate turnaround 
and the month in which the cyclical high was reached are listed in Table 1. From 1979 to 2003 we 
can see four cycles of rising interest rates, which vary considerably in the degree to which rates 
rose. If one uses three-month rates as a yardstick, the smallest rise, at 2.50%, was observed in the 
most recent cycle in 2000. In the long period of restrictive monetary policy at the end of the 1980s  
 
and the early 1990s, the money market rate leapt by 7.6%. The two cycles show that the extent of 
the interest rate hikes can fluctuate widely, making the average increase of just over 5% for the cy-
cles an unreliable figure. The time periods between the first and the last interest rate hikes also di-
verge widely. However, if one excludes the third cycle (when the rising phase lasted 37 months), 
then key rates were raised to a temporary high within a period of well under one year. This observa-
tion suggests that the SNB moves quickly to achieve the targeted interest rate level once it has de-
cided to hike rates. Pinpointing the time when interest rates will turn around is thus extraordinarily 
important. 
 











































































































Table 1: Swiss cycles of rising interest from 1979 to 2003 
                     
  1
st cycle  2
nd cycle  3
rd cycle  4
th cycle  Average 






























Cyclical Low  1.00%  1.10%  2.00%  5.50%  2.50%  1.80%  1.25% - 
2.25% 
1.10%    2.38% 
Last month  Oct 79  Jul 79  Dec 80  Nov 80  Jul 88  March 88  Jan 00  Sep 99     
Cyclical High  3.00%  6.20%  6.00%  10.60%  7.00%  9.40%  3.00% - 
4.00% 
3.60%    7.35% 
First Month  Jan 80  May 80  Aug 81  Nov 81  Aug 91  Jun 92  Jun 00  Oct 00     
Magnitude  2.00%  5.10%  4.00%  5.10%  4.50%  7.60%  1.75%  2.50%  3.06%  5.08% 
Time in months be-
tween  cyclical  low 
and high 
3  10  8  12  37  51  6  13  13.50  21.50 
Lead  of  money 
market  rates  (cycli-
cal  low  of  money 
market rates vs. low 
of key interest rates) 
3  1  4  4  3 
The turnaround is defined as the first month after the cyclical low. 
  
3.  How good are the market forecasts? 
 
Do the market’s expectations form an appropriate basis for making decisions regarding forecasts for 
money market rates? Do the selected forecasts vary in quality? These are the questions we address 
in this section. We select the following market expectations for 3-month money market rates as the 
subject for scrutiny: 
 
(a) Forecasts in 1 to 12 months calculated from the current yield curve (forwards) 
(b) Consensus Economics Inc.’s consensus forecasts in 3 and 12 months  
(c) Forecasts in 1 to 12 months extrapolated from the futures prices for the 3-month money 
market rate 
 
Table 2 includes the notations, the sources of the various data and the observation period. 
 
Table 2: Notations 
Variable Name  Notation  Source  Period 
3-month money market rate  Money3m  SNB  01/89-12/03 
Forwards  forwards[t]  SNB and Zurich Cantonal Bank  01/89-12/03 
Consensus  cons[t]  Consensus Economics Inc.  12/91-12/03 
Futures  ff[t]  LIFFE  12/91-12/03 
 
In order to calculate (a) the forecasts of money market rates based on the yield curve, we derive a 
yield curve at the end of every month for the entire observation period based on the spot rates (daily 
rate, weekly rate, 3-month rate, 6-month and 12-month rate) and the swap rates (2-year, 3-year, 4-
year, 5-year, 7-year and 10-year par rate). The yield curve is interpolated using a cubic spline func-
tion, and simultaneously the par rates are coupon-adjusted so that the present value of every money 
market investment comes to 100. The forwards for the 3-month money market rate can be deter-
mined from the yield curve calculated in this manner as follows: 
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whereas:  Ft,t+3  =  forward in t for the 3-month rate 
  R0,t+3 =  spot rate for the time period 0 to t+3 
  R0,t  =  spot rate for the time period 0 to t 
 
The forecast for the 3-month money market rate in 12 months is thus determined using the spot 
rates for a 15- and a 12-month money market investment, with the spot rates coming from the 
interpolated yield curve. 
Consensus Economic Inc.’s consensus forecasts (b) with a time horizon of three and twelve months 
are published around mid-month. The difference between the time when the data are compiled and 
when they are published nevertheless leads to the conclusion that the consensus forecasts, which 
reach us mid-month, come roughly from the end of the previous month. However, since it is incor-
rect to assume that this information would have already been available at this earlier time point, we 
use at the end of the month the forecasts published mid-month as interest rate predictions for the 
next three or twelve months. 
Making interest rate forecasts using futures (c) also requires some calculations since futures on the 
three-month rate are traded on the LIFFE that only mature every quarter (in March, June, Septem- 
 
ber and December), not monthly. The expiry date is usually a Monday in the middle of the respec-
tive month. In our analysis we use the generic future, which has physical futures contracts as a basis 
but is already rolled on the first day of the expiry month. In the interests of simplicity we have as-
sumed that the price of the generic future at the end of the month preceding the expiry month con-
stitutes an interest rate forecast for the three-month rate in one month’s time, even though the exact 
forecast period tends to be shorter (between twelve and twenty days). If, for example, we are at the 
end of February and the most recent contract expires in mid-March, the futures price can be inter-
preted from the generic future on the 28
th or 29
th of February as a forecast of the three-month rate in 
one month’s time. In order to derive an interest rate forecast valid in two to twelve months, we must 
make an additional assumption; since other generic futures are based on futures contracts that ex-
pire in the following quarters, at the end of February in addition to the forecast for the three-month 
money market rate in one month, there are also forecasts for the rate in four (expiry in mid-June), 
seven (expiry in mid-September), ten (expiry in mid-December) and thirteen (expiry in mid-March 
of the following year) months. Given these market forecasts, we have linearly interpolated the fore-
casts for the interim months from the corresponding generic futures and, if necessary, from the cur-
rent three-month money market rate.  
 
In evaluating the three forecast series, we asked the following questions: 
(a) Are the forecasts systematically biased upwards or downwards? 
(b) How well-suited are the individual data samples for simple trend forecasts? 
(c) Does the quality of the various market forecasts differ in phases of rising and falling interest 
rates? 
 
First we test (a) the three market forecasts for lack of bias.[1] If appropriate, we wish to identify a 
pattern in the forecast errors. An efficient forecast assumes in the equation 
 
k - t t forecast * Money3m b a + =   (2) 
 
for ￿ values close to 0 and for ￿ values close to 1. Using a simple regression analysis we estimated 
these two variables in differences for our market forecasts and then tested the null hypothesis ￿ =0 
and ￿=1 applying a Wald test. The null hypothesis could be rejected for the entire period for all the 
included forecasts (see Table 3). The almost consistently high t values of the various estimates for ￿ 
signal a high probability of systematic forecast errors. The negative signs suggest that increases 
have been overestimated and declines underestimated. Furthermore, the error increases as the fore-
casting horizon lengthens. Measured against the value of ￿, the forecasts from the yield curve ap-
pear to show the smallest forecast error. This is true for all the observed time periods. 
 Table 3: Test for systematic forecast errors 
Variable  Regression coefficients  Wald test 
  ￿  t-Stat.  ￿  t-Stat.  F-Stat.  Prob. 
ff1  -0.0  -1.7  -0.2  2.2  84.0  0.0 
ff3  -0.2  -2.3  0.1  0.5  17.8  0.0 
ff6  -0.4  -3.2  0.6  2.2  6.9  0.0 
ff9  -0.7  -3.7  0.7  2.2  8.8  0.0 
ff12  -0.8  -2.3  0.9  1.7  6.5  0.0 
             
cons3  -0.2  -2.3  0.1  0.6  21.0  0.0 
cons12  -0.8  -3.4  0.5  1.8  16.5  0.0 
             
forward1  -0.0  -1.1  -0.1  -1.0  101.7  0.0 
forward3  -0.1  -1.4  0.1  0.4  28.7  0.0 
forward6  -0.2  -1.8  0.2  0.8  10.1  0.0 
forward9  -0.4  -2.1  0.2  0.7  11.2  0.0 
forward12  -0.6  -2.5  0.2  0.9  14.0  0.0 
 
How well can the various forecast data (b) recognise the direction in which interest rates will head 
in future? Once again we use the individual market forecasts and the various forecasting horizons. 
For the empirical assessment of the quality of the trend forecasts, we carry out an c
2 test for inde-
pendence.[2] This investigates to what degree the accuracy of the trend forecast systematically di-
verges from a random forecast. This test is based on a so-called 2x2 contingency table for each 
variable that shows the number of correct forecasts in the main diagonal. The combined rate of ac-
curacy  can  be  calculated  from  the  equation  (N11+N22)/N.  The  test  data  is  asymptotically  c
2-
distributed with one degree of freedom. In some cases it is possible that the null hypothesis, i.e. a 
random forecast, is rejected without the combined rate of accuracy itself being above 50%. This can 
occur if the status — for example, “forecast falling” — is infrequent but the rate of accuracy is very 
high, and the other status is more frequent and the rate of accuracy here is less than 50%. Table 4 
shows such a contingency table. The test results are somewhat discouraging (see Table 5). In the 
trend forecast neither the consensus nor the forwards differ from the random forecast. The futures 
are, statistically speaking, significantly better than tossing a coin at least for the forecast horizons 
from eight up to and including eleven months. 
 
Table 4: Contingency table used in c c c c
2 test for independence 
       
  Actual change is positive  Actual change is negative   
Forecast rising  N11  N12  N1. 
Forecast falling  N21  N22  N2. 
  N.1  N.2  N 
       
  
 
Table 5: c c c c
2 test for quality of trend forecasts 
Variable  Number of in-
creases 
Number of decreases  Chi-squared test 
  Actual  Forecast  Actual  Forecast  Critical Value  Prob. 
ff1  63  84  79  58  0.01  0.92 
ff3  50  82  88  56  1.38  0.24 
ff6  36  88  101  49  2.46  0.12 
ff9  36  93  98  41  4.54  0.03 
ff12  27  70  51  8  1.92  0.17 
             
cons3  61  101  102  62  0.00  0.95 
cons12  39  99  114  54  2.15  0.14 
             
forward1  82  112  96  66  0.04  0.85 
forward3  70  108  106  68  0.93  0.34 
forward6  55  106  118  67  2.05  0.15 
forward9  52  109  118  61  1.59  0.21 
forward12  49  108  118  59  0.68  0.41 
 
It is possible (c) that the various market forecasts vary in terms of quality during times of rising and 
falling interest rates. In order to examine this question, we have divided the observation period into 
regimes of rising and regimes of falling three-month rates. The decision criterion is the actual 
change over the various forecast horizons. For example, ex post throughout the observation period 
each month in which the three-month LIBOR rose (fell) in X monthly comparison is taken into ac-
count. The other data points are removed from the sample. The data sets so construed — exactly 
one per forecast horizon and per interest rate direction — are compared with the X month forecast. 
The identified forecasting errors for rising and falling phases can thus be evaluated separately by 
forecast horizon. These calculations have brought to light some interesting results (see Figure 3). 
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First, the futures — measured on the basis of average forecast error — produce the best forecasts in 
cross comparison in times of rising interest rates. Other error measurements came to the same con-
clusion, such as the root mean square error (RMSE), which weights major forecast errors more 
heavily than minor ones.[3] Only in the 12-month forecast did the consensus prove to be as accu-rate. Second, it is apparent that for the futures the error does not rise with the forecast horizon, or 
only marginally so if the RMSE is taken into account. A three-month forecast using futures was 
thus historically just as good in phases of rising interest rates as a 12-month forecast. However — 
thirdly — the various interest rate expectations achieve only a very low rate of accuracy (hit ratio). 
This rate shows how often the forecast increases materialised in the end. Even in short forecast pe-
riods — for example with a horizon of three months — the various forecasts did not achieve a rate 
of accuracy of 50% or more. Nevertheless, this comes as no surprise in view of the secular trend of 
falling interest rates. Thus the evaluations of regimes with falling interest rates show a reversed pic-
ture (see Figure 4). The hit ratio of the various three-month forecasts is at around 75%. It is also 
striking that the rate of accuracy does not improve much if the forecast is more pronounced (larger 
difference between forecast and actual value).  
 
Figure 4: Hit ratio when forecasting falling interest rates  
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Overall, our statistical evaluations point to the following conclusion: Market forecasts do not help 
us much in determining the timing of an interest rate turnaround. If, as is now the case, the next 
move on interest rates is likely to be an increase in the three-month rates and one does not want to 
completely ignore market forecasts, then the latter should be read using futures prices. 
 
4.  A response function for the SNB’s monetary policy and its application options 
 
In the following section we attempt to illustrate the SNB’s interest rate policy with the help of a re-
sponse function. The Taylor rule [4] often used in this connection differs from the concept we se-
lected here in two points. First, the Taylor rule is a normative approach that proposes a money mar-
ket rate for the current macro-economic climate. Among other things information about the poten-
tial growth and the central bank’s target inflation rate is necessary to calculate the Taylor rate. Since 
the first variable in particular cannot be observed directly and must be estimated, the uncertainty is 
correspondingly very high. We, on the other hand, try to describe the actual interest rate policy us-
ing a simple statistical model. Our approach is thus a positive analysis. Second, we use consensus 
data as the explanatory variable for the interest rate policy. With this we take into account the fact  
 
that the central bank must pursue a forward-looking monetary policy. It takes some time — accord-
ing to empirical tests for Switzerland, between four and eight quarters [5] — until the money market 
rates have their maximum impact on real economic growth. The inflation rate reacts even later. The 
SNB  thus  either  reduces  or  raises  interest  rates  correspondingly,  if  something  in  its  forecasts 
changes. We use data on the consensus regarding inflation and real GDP growth. This approach im-
plicitly assumes that the central bank’s forecasts do not differ from the average expectations of pro-
fessional economists. Unfortunately the SNB’s published inflation forecasts do not go far enough 
back in order for us to be able to use the central bank’s actual expectations. For the two types of 
data used, monthly forecasts are available since 1990 for the current and the following year. From 
this we construct a time series for growth and inflation expectations, with the two forecast horizons 
variably weighted. The forecast data are calculated as follows (see Figure 5): 
 





+ + =   (3) 
 
whereas:  t  =  Forecast month (e.g. May: t=5) 
  Expt
y   =  Expectations for this year 
  Expt
y+1  =  Expectations for next year 
 
The weighting of the forecast for the current year thus drops the longer the year has already been 
underway (the principle of the 12-month forward variables). 
 

















We have regressed the expectations for the economy (Exp
GDP) and inflation (Exp
INF) together with a 
constant to the three-month rates and set the estimate time span from January 1990 to December 
1998 (108 observations). This gave us the following parameters (see Figure 6):[6] 
 
INF GDP Exp * 2.3 Exp * 0.5 -2.0 Money3m + + =   (4) 
 According  to  these  estimates,  the  SNB  weights  inflation  expectations  four  times  as  heavily  as 
growth expectations in its interest rate policy. Such a long-term relationship is commensurate with 
the targets of Swiss monetary policy. In the past there were two phases in which money market 
rates diverged sharply from the estimated values according to the above long-term relationship. In 
the first phase at the beginning of the 1990s, the German Bundesbank’s restrictive monetary policy 
in the wake of reunification in particular led to European interest rates that did not match the eco-
nomic realities in many countries. This was also the case in Switzerland. In the second phase in 
around 1995, we believe that the divergence of money market rates from their fundamental value 
could be traced back to the sharp decline in money supply growth. At the time the SNB formally 
pursued an indirect target via money supply. 
 





































































An important requirement of our response function is the stability of the implied relationships. 
Hence the estimated weighting factors, which were determined in-sample, must be able to describe 
the movements of the money market rates by using the realised forecasts as of 1999 (out-of-sample 
forecasts). Figure 7 shows the results. The most important conclusion first: The model can recog-
nise the entire interest rate cycle with mounting money market rates as of the third quarter of 1999, 
with interest rates peaking towards the end of 2000 and the subsequent phase with a trend of falling 
money market rates. This is a considerable accomplishment for such a long time period — no less 
than five years. Nevertheless there are some weak points. The model recognised the rising phase 
but underestimated the increase by an average of almost 75 basis points. The relative increase — 
i.e. compared with the starting level — was satisfactorily predicted. The model also sent four false 
signals in the phase of falling interest rates since the beginning of 2001. Between January and June 
of 2002, the model even pointed to rising interest rates of one percentage point. In this phase, sen-
timent indicators improved clearly worldwide. The consequences were rising growth and inflation 
expectations. A wave of accounting scandals and emerging concerns about a war with Iraq kept the 
upswing from materialising, so that shortly thereafter expectations were revised downwards again. 
The three other false signals, rises of around 50 basis points, were much less extreme. As a result 
we conclude that the signals must be very clear in order to ensure a sufficient basis for making deci- 
 
sions. In the following scenario analysis, we estimate the various reactions of the SNB to changes in 
expectations. 
 








































































With the help of our response function, it is possible to generate a “iso-yield curve system”. Fig-
ure 8 has lines showing all combinations of growth and inflation expectations, in which the SNB 
keeps interest rates constant at a certain level.  
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The slopes in Figure 8 signal the different priorities of the inflation or growth expectations in the 
SNB’s decision-making process. A possible application is scenario analyses. These are based on the 
assumption of historically consistent behaviour on the part of the SNB; in future the SNB will be-
have similarly to the way it did in the past given an unchanged macro-economic outlook. As we can see in Table 6, various macro scenarios can be assigned to the corresponding money 
market rates. The importance of inflation expectations was obvious. Hence money market rates of 
between 0% and 5% can be assigned to a given growth outlook of 1.8 — similar to that at the cur-
rent time. The calculations also show that if deflation expectations are present, i.e. an anticipated in-
flation rate of minus 0.5 percent, the money market rates would be at zero regardless of the state of 
the economy. Our response function serves, in the end, as a rule of thumb to estimate roughly a 
consistent interest rate level. 
 
Table 6: Money market rates with alternative inflation and growth expectations 
             
    Inflation expectations 
    0.6%  1.0%  1.5%  2.5%  -0.5% 
-0.5%  0.0%  0.0%  1.2%  3.5%  0.0% 
0.0%  0.0%  0.3%  1.5%  3.8%  0.0% 
1.8%  0.3%  1.2%  2.4%  4.7%  0.0% 
2.5%  0.6%  1.6%  2.7%  5.0%  0.0% 





















3.5%  1.1%  2.1%  3.2%  5.5%  0.0% 
             
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This report provides assistance in forecasting Swiss monetary policy. The analysis of various mar-
ket expectations provides sobering results. The market forecasts — regardless of how they are actu-
ally measured — show statistically significant and systematic forecast errors. Even in the simple 
trend forecast for money market rates, they only seldom beat the toss of a coin. If one divides the 
observation periods into phases of rising and falling interest rates, the futures forecasts prove supe-
rior to the other two methods. First, they result in smaller forecast errors, and second, the forecast-
ing quality does not deteriorate with the forecast period. However, this method is unable to replace 
an assessment of the central bank’s decision-making considerations. 
We approached the question of a potential rise in yields in rising interest rate cycles in a first step 
by observing historical increasing phases. In the four periods since 1979, the average rise in key in-
terest rates came to three percentage points. Nonetheless, there are major differences among the pe-
riods, and hence the “average cycle” is not of much assistance. In a second step, we attempted to 
describe  the  SNB’s  monetary  policy  using  a  response  function.  Based  on  the  forward-looking 
character of monetary policy, we used expectations data as the explanatory variables. Our analysis 
points to a stable interest rate policy on the part of the SNB, with inflation expectations being more 
than four times as heavily weighted as growth expectations. This response function permits us to 
draw conclusions about the yield level on the money market with given macro-economic expecta-
tions. However, the conclusions are based on the assumption that the SNB will behave similarly as 
it did in the past. If the inflation outlook stays at its current, low level, even a sharp increase in 
growth forecasts does not necessarily mean the Swiss National Bank will see any significant need 
to hike interest rates. Merely a small increase in inflation expectations would, however, have major 




[1] The approach of testing for lack of bias in the first step and testing the quality of the trend fore-
casts in the second step was used in a similar manner by BOFINGER/SCHMIDT (2003) in their 
evaluation of exchange rate forecasts. 
 
[2] For a more detailed description of this test, please refer to e.g. DIEBOLD/LOPEZ (1996). 
 
[3] See e.g. GREENE (2003) for details on calculating RMSE. 
 
[4] This rule, much discussed in the literature, is based on TAYLOR (1993). 
 
[5] See ROTH (2003). 
 
[6] The variables used cannot with certainty – a margin of error of 5% – be classified as stationary, 
and hence it would seem appropriate to estimate an error correction model. The equation (4) can 
therefore be interpreted as a long-term relationship; first, the residuals of the equation are stationary 
(ADF statistic: -3.59; critical value according to the cointegration test of MACKINNON (1991) -
3.39, according to ENGLE/YOO (1987) -3.62), proving a cointegration relationship between the 
variables on the basis of a margin of error of a good 5% (the critical values specified for the stan-
dard Dickey-Fuller case of a directly observable time series are not correct since OLS residuals are 
used here). Second, the analysis of the short-term relationship shows that the coefficient of the error 
term of the long-term equation is less than zero (-0.062, t-statistic: -1.82), which is statistically sig-
nificant. This means that the money market rates, after diverging from equilibrium in the long-term 
relationship, will converge back to this relationship and that this adjustment process lasts an aver-
age 16 months. According to the specifications of the short-term relationship, the error terms clearly 
show the “white noise” characteristic. Our stability investigations for the coefficients, such as the 
CUSUM test of squares of BROWN et. al. (1975), show good results and indicate that the SNB did 
not make any structural changes in its monetary policy in the time period under review. Since both 
explanatory variables (inflation and growth expectations) show a positive correlation with one an-
other in the long term, the simultaneous application of both factors poses the risk of an identifica-
tion problem. According to the condition number of BESLEY et al. (1980), however, multicolline-
arity does not pose a problem in the specified long-term relationship. This is also true for the analy-
sis of selected sub-samples. Both non-stationary time series can therefore be used together as ex-
planatory variables. REFERENCES 
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